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Freeriding in Inter-Provider Spectrum Sharing
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Abstract—Primary-secondary spectrum sharing is limited in
terms of design space, and may not be sufficient to meet the
ever-increasing demand of connectivity and high signal quality.
The next step to increase spectrum sharing efficiency is to design
markets where sharing takes place among primary providers
rather than leaving it to the limited case where the primary
licensee is idle. Attaining contractual spectrum sharing among
primary providers, a.k.a. co-primary or inter-provider sharing,
involves additional costs for the users, e.g., roaming fee. Co-
primary spectrum sharing without additional charge to the users
poses two major challenges: a) regulatory approaches must be
introduced to incentivize providers to share spectrum resources,
and b) small providers in co-primary spectrum sharing markets
may freeride on large providers’ networks as the customers of the
small providers may be using the spectrum and infrastructure
resources of large providers. Such freeriding opportunities must
be minimized to realize the benefits of primary-level sharing.
We consider a subsidy-based spectrum sharing (SBSS) market
to facilitate co-primary spectrum sharing where providers are
explicitly incentivized to share spectrum resources. We focus on
minimizing freeriding in SBSS markets and introduce a game-
theoretic model to regulate the freeriding. We use the model to
explore operational regimes with minimal freeriding.
Index Terms—Spectrum Sharing, Network Sharing, Spectrum
Management, Game Theory, Subsidy Markets.
I. Introduction
Spectrum utilization via sharing has seen several schemes
over time, e.g., dynamic spectrum access (DSA) [2], device-
to-device communications underlaying a cellular network [3],
and roaming [4]. However, most of these techniques focus on
spectrum sharing at primary-secondary basis, i.e., a secondary
user can use a band when the primary user is idle. Such
sharing increases spectrum utilization, but the underlying
techniques emphasize providers’ incentive rather than end
users’ experience. Further, the potential of such secondary-
level spectrum sharing is limited to utilizing whatever is left
Initial results of this work on equilibrium analysis of SBSS markets
appeared in Proceedings of IEEE DySPAN Conference, 2018 [1]. This
manuscript extends the conference paper by (i) exploring details of customers’
averseness to price, (ii) the effect of marginal signal improvement (i.e., a
measure of how much room exists in a provider’s network for improvement)
on market equilibrium, (iii) properties of the probability of customer switching
(which models the likelihood of freeriding) and its effects on equilibrium,
(iv) exploration of always-on full sharing mode of participating providers,
(vi) effect of sharing on different call types, i.e., home calls, foreign calls,
rejected foreign calls, and (vii) game in a multi-provider market.
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from the primary users. Recently, several attempts have aimed
to take this sharing to primary level (e.g., co-primary [5],
inter-operator [6], multi-operator [7] spectrum sharing) where
sharing takes place even though the primary user may be
busy. Spectrum sharing at primary-level seems necessary to
maximize end users’ overall wireless experience and optimize
“micro-opportunities” arising in radio propagation [8]. For
example, in urban areas, a user might go into dark spots (e.g.,
no coverage or low signal quality) even though his provider
has overall the largest coverage or the highest average signal
quality. The user located in a dark spot could be served by
other providers if there exists an extensive spectrum sharing
among providers and users at the primary level.
Consider the real-world example shown in Fig. 1a. It illus-
trates an overlapping coverage map of two primary cellular
providers Sprint and Verizon. If the providers have any differ-
ence in coverage signal strength within the operating region, it
appears as dark black area in the coverage difference map. In
some places, a Sprint customer may find himself out of cov-
erage or get weak coverage while a Verizon customer enjoys
seamless connectivity because of Verizon’s better coverage.
On the other hand, a Verizon customer may find himself in a
spot with a weak signal due complex radio propagation. We
call these situations as “micro-opportunities” for sharing at the
primary level. In another case, a Sprint customer will get better
service than a Verizon customer as the existence of Verizon
coverage was not reported in an area according to the map of
Fig. 1b. Note that radio propagation may present many more
micro-opportunities in overlapping coverage areas as Fig. 1a
only shows the radio coverage difference. If providers (Verizon
and Sprint in this example) are incentivized to serve each
other’s customers, the end user’s experience could notably
be improved. The only available economic framework for co-
primary spectrum-shared market is cellular roaming [4]. An
interesting feature of roaming is that it does not require any
governmental regulation. However, it works well when partic-
ipating providers have significant non-overlapping coverage.
To reap the benefits of spectrum sharing in physically smaller
markets, and utilize micro-opportunities for improving user
experience, we need schemes to incentivize providers that
may be competing with each other in overlapping regions of
coverage.
Regulatory authorities around the world are aligning with
the recent trends of spectrum sharing. The FCC’s vision of
the U.S. National Broadband Plan [10] and the wireless com-
munity (i.e., industry and academic researchers) are exploring
regimes where sharing is pervasive and even the norm [11].
However, due to the expenditures associated with the licensed
bands, a provider is reluctant to share its spectrum resources
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(b) Non-overlapping region [9]
Fig. 1: Coverage Difference
with other providers unless the sharing brings financial benefit.
Incentivizing providers to share their spectrum resources has
picked up attention recently [12]. Such cooperation can also
be done by injecting some governmental or semi-governmental
regulation, although other motivations to improve the “larger
good” (e.g., public safety) do exist. As providers get incentive
to share their licensed bands, they get more freedom to
improve infrastructure and can provide better service without
charging more fees to end-users. This helps maximizing users’
welfare. Yet, such pervasive sharing introduces the problem
of freeriding. If strong providers (i.e., large providers in terms
of coverage areas, signal strengths and service rates) share
their spectrum bands with the users of weak providers, the
weak providers might freeride. In particular, if the incentive is
given externally/explicitly (e.g., government subsidy in energy
and power markets [13]), weak providers will have incentive
to freeride in the shared spectrum markets. In this paper,
we outline the emergence of freeriders in pervasively shared
inter-provider spectrum markets where sharing takes place at
the primary-level aiming to improve connectivity and wireless
experience of end-users. We analyze this issue by introducing
a game-theoretic model of head-to-head competitions between
providers and exploring regimes where freeriding can be
minimized.
In an open market, all participating providers prefer fewer
government regulations. So, we try to involve the government
as little as possible and focus on finding market equilibrium
only involving activities of the providers. A government uses
collected license fees to operate spectrum regulatory authority
and a significant portion of surplus money goes to national
reserve for serving other purposes [14]. A question now arises:
why does not the government use this money to improve users’
wireless experiences? Incentivizing providers from this surplus
money can motivate them to share spectrum resources and
reduce additional fees, e.g., roaming fees, for the users. In
our previous work [15], we have discussed the government’s
role in giving a performance-based subsidy to the service
providers with the goal of maximizing social welfare. In this
paper, we focus on the issues arising with the subsidy-based
spectrum sharing (SBSS) model and solving them, and involve
the government only when providing a performance-based
subsidy, determining the amount of subsidy to avoid freeriding
and applying a penalty when required. Providers get subsidy
on the basis of “proof-of-sharing”, which quantifies how much
a provider has shared its resources with another provider’s
customers with a weaker signal/coverage at a certain time and
location [16], [17]. This “proof-of-sharing” can ensure truth-
fulness of spectrum sharing and provide necessary information
to the government. In our work, we assume truthfulness in
the “proof-of-sharing” and use it to determine the subsidy
amount. This subsidy goes for a certain time period. After
each period, the provider’s sharing information gets assessed
and the provider gets penalized based on it’s service record.
Thus, effectively, the providers get a varying subsidy after each
assessment period.
A. Contributions
Major contributions of this work on minimizing freeriding
in a co-primary SBSS market are as follows:
• We develop a game-theoretic framework to minimize
freeriding while maintaining spectrum sharing at the
primary level.
• We formulate a two-player non-cooperative game of head-
to-head competition in the market, with one large provider
(a.k.a spectrum sharing provider) and one small provider
(a.k.a probable freeriding provider), calculate revenue
(i.e., payoff) of each provider, and find Nash Equilibrium
(NE) of the game.
• Our model is able to determine the maximum possible
sharing by the large provider while avoiding freeriding
(considering other conditions remain unchanged).
• This model shows how to prevent or reduce the small
providers’ freeriding opportunities, by adjusting the large
provider’s subsidy amount.
• Our model sheds light on regulating providers’ subscrip-
tion fees (i.e., service prices) to minimize freeriding, with
respect to fair market fees.
• The game-theory analysis identifies operational regimes
where the large provider earns at least the earnings of
a non-shared market irrespective of its willingness to
share (i.e., percentage of accepting incoming calls/service
requests from the customers of the small provider) and the
small provider’s strategies to steal customers and freeride.
• We show the existence of operational regimes without
freeriding in a two-provider market with the exception
where both providers enter into the freeriding Pure Strat-
egy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) region (explained later in
Section VI) due to the excessive subsidy which was given
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to the large provider. Before reaching this condition, the
large provider gets at least the earnings of non-shared
market by playing a mixed strategy or a freeriding-free
pure strategy.
B. Key Insights
We run a simulation based on our game-theoretic framework
on an SBSS market where two providers (one large provider
and one small provider) are competing in a region to attract
customers from a common pool of 1000 participants who have
high price elasticity. Each customer makes two types of calls:
a) home calls and foreign calls. Initially the large provider
enters with a high interest to share its spectrum resources
and the small provider does not share (all detailed in Section
VI). As our goal is to maintain better connectivity to improve
end-users’ wireless experience irrespective of their choice of
provider, we only consider call service to evaluate our model.
From this market, our findings are as follows:
• If the large provider’s willingness to share is at most 69%,
it can maintain this sharing for entire subsidy period by
playing a pure strategy without incurring any revenue loss
irrespective of the small provider’s charging fee. If the
willingness to share is more than 69%, the large provider
plays a mixed strategy where it can only maintain this
willingness to share for a certain duration of subsidy
period to ensure no revenue loss from freeriding.
• If the ratio of the small provider’s charging fee to the fair
market fee is at most 41%, the large provider can operate
with sharing its infrastructure at any level, i.e., willingness
to share being 100%. If the fees ratio is greater than 41%,
the game follows a mixed strategy.
• A small amount of subsidy can motivate a provider for
more sharing if both providers get the chance to improve
signal strengths (described in Section VI).
• If a participating provider is too large compared to the
other provider, we observe a non-freeriding regime. It
happens because the customers of the small provider
perceive low quality signal compared the large provider.
On the other hand, if the participating providers are
similar in size, no freeriding takes place.
• A spectrum sharing provider is more interested to play
mixed strategy due to customers’ price elasticity.
• By considering all head-to-head competitions, a spectrum
sharing provider gets necessary strategies from the game
NEs to tackle each of its competitors’ freeriding strate-
gies in the market. Thus, our model provides effective
solutions in a multi-provider environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
related works are discussed. Section III describes the freeriding
issue in SBSS cellular markets and, in Section IV, we illustrate
the SBSS market model. In Section V, we present a two-
provider SBSS cellular market, formulate a two-provider game
and finally, extend the game to a multi-provider environment.
We outline the experimental evaluation of our model in Section
VI. Finally, we conclude in Section VII.
II. RelatedWorks
Spectrum sharing via database-driven approaches can man-
age the shared co-existence of users in-case of heterogeneous
access [18] and a full-duplex wireless technology can enable
concurrent transmission, reception, higher spectrum efficiency
and secondary throughput while minimizing hidden station
problem [19]. A decentralized database-driven blockchain-
based DSA was analyzed in [20]. It considers the benefits
and limitations of blockchain solutions in general, and then
examines their potential application on spectrum sharing. Geo-
location-based spectrum sharing to priority users where higher
priority users get spectrum allocation based on its traffic load
and lower priority users complete to get spectrum from the
unallocated portion can offer a stable and efficient spectrum
allocation [21].
A cooperation among competing providers can be achieved
with the “magnitude” of sharing which is counted by the
number of favors each provider makes to other providers
[22]. The virtualization of spectrum resources into fungible
chunks can improve market liquidity by yielding viable market
outcomes for secondary spectrum markets [23]. It explores
the hinders of the emergence of liquid secondary markets
for the radio spectrum, permits to develop an appropriate,
tradeable, and spectrum-related commodity, and accounts the
physical constraints inherent to the electromagnetic spectrum
for the secondary market. A blind beamforming technique for
secondary transmitters and a blind interference cancellation
technique for secondary receivers was addressed in [24]. These
two MIMO-based interference cancellation techniques use an
underlay spectrum sharing scheme for cognitive radio net-
works where the primary users are oblivious to the secondary
users. Deep reinforcement learning-based spectrum sharing
using recurrent neural networks provides the ability in learning
optimal strategies without any prior knowledge of any node’s
behavior to utilize multiple channels with the presence of
multiple heterogeneous primary users was discussed in [25].
This work also demonstrates how a node copes with the multi-
rate and multi-agents scenarios in dynamic spectrum sharing
environments.
Spectrum sharing among micro-operators (MOs) to meet the
demand for local service delivery in indoor small cell networks
was discussed in [26]. It used a homogeneous Poisson point
process to model the locations of the small cell base stations of
the MOs that are going to share spectrum subbands and sug-
gests which subbands a buyer MO should purchase from the
regulator to satisfy QoS. Spectrum broker service for MOs and
citizens-broadband-radio-service (CBRS) for priority-access-
licenses (PAL) was considered in [27]. The spectrum broker
allocates available spectrum to operators per demand and
charges price. The concept of spectrum brokering is similar to
our approach in aiming to attain a more effective and pervasive
sharing of the spectrum at the primary level. A market model
for the sub-leasing spectrum by PAL users with short-term
license allocation in smaller areas with the coordination of
a spectrum access system to maximizes the financial gain to
the PAL holder was addressed in [28]. On-demand spectrum
access from the CBRS to dynamically set-up application-
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oriented virtual topologies to support user applications was
discussed in [29]. It estimates the blocking probability of
spectrum demands from PAL users, the network capacity, and
the number of free spectrum bands available for lower priority
general authorized access users. Utilizing mmWave spectrum
bands using licensed spectrum access to coordinate sharing
among cellular operators to increase the available capacity was
addressed in [30]. It applies European and Italian regulatory
conditions to simulate DSA in 5G scenarios.
The maximum total throughput of a coexisting spectrum-
sharing Long Term Evolution (LTE) and WiFi network under
two fairness constraints including throughput fairness and
3GPP fairness was addressed in [31]. It uses the Category
3 or Category 4 Listen-Before-Talk mechanism to improve
the mean successful transmission time of the LTE network.
End-users’ provider selection based on the sum of congestion
and price advertised by primary and secondary providers was
addressed in [32]. They assume the congestion of the primary
provider is caused by its subscribers and the congestion of sec-
ondary providers occurs with the presence of both subscribers.
Although these efforts have a similar flavor to ours in tackling
inter-provider issues, they only consider primary vs. secondary
provider sharing cases.
Utility-based freeriding control in peer-to-peer (P2P) sys-
tems has been described in [33]. Users are penalized based
on the total number of files shared, the total size of data
shared and the popularity of the shared content. Payment-based
control is another way to prevent freeriding in P2P systems.
In [34], two decentralized payment methods were delineated:
(1) the sender uploads the required payments and each inter-
mediate node earns a fee when the packet traverses through
that node, and (2) each node buys packet from previous node
and sells to the next node, while finally the receiver pays
the total cost. Although these freeriding control efforts have
considered the game-theoretic issues, the freeriding problem in
P2P systems is different from the freeriding in SBSS markets.
Each participant in the P2P systems must be equal whereas
the participant in our game must be different in size to see any
freeriding. Further, the timescale of the game in P2P systems
is much shorter than what is possible in the SBSS markets. To
the best of our knowledge, detailed consideration and game-
theoretic modeling of freeriding in shared spectrum markets
has not been studied.
III. Freeriding in Subsidy-Based Spectrum Sharing (SBSS)
In SBSS markets [15], a subsidy from the government to
providers can contribute to increasing user welfare. The end
users will not need to pay more subscription fees for service
when they are in suburban areas or out of their provider’s
coverage. Further, they will receive a better quality of experi-
ence due to micro-opportunities arising in urban settings. Thus,
putting the end user’s received quality of experience as the top
priority is one of the main motivations for our work on SBSS
markets.
An SBSS market operating within a region is visualized
in Fig. 2. It is built on an existing cellular market with the
















































Fig. 2: An SBSS market
Initially, the customers choose providers based on the utility of
the offered services. The government subsidizes the providers
to share their spectrum with foreign customers (i.e., ones sub-
scribed to another provider) and penalizes based on proof-of-
sharing [16]. The providers try to maximize revenue earnings
by serving as many foreign calls as they can without hurting
their service quality.
In [15], we considered the benefits of an SBSS market.
However, we did not analyze the potential risks of this market.
It can result in a situation that provides an opportunity to a
weak provider to freeride on a strong provider’s infrastructure.
We consider a weak provider as a small provider with weak
signal strength, small coverage area, or low service rate
compared to its competitor provider, which we call the strong
provider or large provider. When a weak provider advertises
relatively smaller subscription fees compared to its fair market
fees and the strong provider’s fees, it can unfairly attract
customers who would normally go to the strong providers in a
fair market. Since strong providers are motivated to serve the
users of the weak providers because of the extra subsidy, the
weak providers may exploit this situation and tend to freeride
on the strong providers’ network infrastructure. Further, strong
providers will not be able to drop subscription fees below
a certain level due to high maintenance costs, and may not
retain their customers who eventually switch to other providers
offering lower fees.
Assume an SBSS cellular market with Providers 1 and 2
as shown in Fig. 3. The dashed circles encapsulate each of
the providers’ coverage domination. Some regions are equally
dominated by both providers while others are dominated by
one of them. Provider 1 is, overall, stronger as it has more base
station (BS) support than 2. Also, due to higher infrastructure
costs, Provider 1’s subscription fees are expected to be higher
in an existing market. Consider a region where Provider 1
has better network coverage. If a customer wants to get a
strong connection, he should subscribe to Provider 1 in an
existing market. In fact, if there was no subsidy, Provider
1 would retain these customers. However, under the SBSS
market, the weak one, Provider 2, can offer cheap subscription
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Fig. 3: Provider 1 and 2’s coverage
fees due to its small infrastructure costs. Further, Provider
1 is incentivized to serve Provider 2’s customers. Thus, if
Provider 1 shares its BSes with Provider 2’s customers too
much, the overall quality of the network service will appear
to be similar for both Provider 1’s and 2’s subscribers. Then,
for the customers, the only perceived difference between two
providers will be the subscription fees. As the customers are
highly sensitive to price, these fees differences will cause
unfair customer switching (UCS) in favor of Provider 2.
To make it fair, Provider 2 should increase its fees to fair
market levels (i.e., similar to Provider 1’s fees), but it has
no motivation to do so in the SBSS market. Due to the
potential revenue loss from freeriding, no strong providers will
agree to join the SBSS market. To ensure their participation,
we address freeriding and UCS issues in the SBSS markets,
and minimize them using spectrum sharing strategies obtained
from our proposed game-theoretic framework.
IV. A BaselineModel for SBSS Market
Assume a set of J network providers, denoted by J , that
are competing within same region in an SBSS market. A
customer i will choose j as “home provider” based on the
overall signal strength/quality, ψ j, and the subscription fee,
f j, of provider j, and treats any other provider k ∈ J \ { j}
as a “foreign provider”. We assume a single subscription fee
for all customers of a provider and do not consider different
fees based on service quality within a provider. Since our
focus is on freeriding among providers, differentiation of the
fees across providers enables us to observe inter-provider
dynamics in terms of regulating freeriding. The SBSS market
may result in a customer being served by a foreign provider
in addition to its subscribed home provider, depending on the
received signal quality from these providers as well as the
providers’ willingness to share their infrastructure. A provider
treats all customers as “foreign customer” if the customers
are subscribed to other providers. Based on these selections
(to be detailed next), the number of customers subscribing to
provider j can be expressed as:
n j = N( f j, ψ j) (1)
where the demand function N(·) is a decreasing convex func-
tion with respect to (w.r.t.) f j and an increasing concave func-
tion w.r.t. ψ j. The shape of a demand function w.r.t to price is
usually a decreasing convex function [35], which we follow in
our model. Further, the utility from a service diminishes with
the increase of service consumption [36]. If we continuously
increase the signal strength of a provider, after a certain limit,
the marginal improvement of perceived signal strength will
saturate and become insignificant. To model this, we shape
the demand function as increasing concave form w.r.t. the
provider’s signal strength.
A. Customer i’s Provider Selection
Assume each customer i, on average, makes γ calls during a
fixed time period. Among them, he makes βi, j = σ(X j) home
calls where 0 ≤ βi, j ≤ γ, and σ(·) is an increasing concave
function w.r.t. the number of BS, X j, of his home provider j.
The probability to find customer i’s home BS during making
a call increases with the increase of home BS count. Since the
marginal benefit of adding more BSes diminishes in terms of
covering calls from subscribed customers [37], we assume σ(·)
as a concave function. The customer i also makes αi, j = γ−βi, j
foreign calls.
We model a customer’s selection of a home provider via
its utility of the service quality. Let a customer’s utility
function, u(·), be an increasing concave function of the signal
intensity/quality of service available to that customer. Then,
customer i’s overall utility from subscribing to provider j can
be expressed as:
U(i, j) = βi, ju(ψ j) − f j. (2)
A provider’s offered aggregate utility from service must be
positive. Otherwise, in reality, no customer will be interested
in getting a subscription. This positive difference is the gain a
customer can expect from a subscription where βi, ju(ψ j) > f j.
If a provider cannot maintain this condition, the gained utility
will not be attractive to the customers. In such a scenario, we
set the offered aggregate utility to 0. As a result, the provider
can not participate in the SBSS market because it will not
have a customer base. We assume f j ≤ fmax where fmax is the
maximum subscription fee above which no provider can run
profitable cellular operations in a competitive market. Finding
an optimal value of fmax involves exploration of several market
factors as well as business strategies of providers. In this paper,
we consider fmax as the maximum of all providers subscription
fees for similar service in a non-shared market.
Based on (2), customer i will select provider j as his home





We get this probabilistic provider selection from Contest
Theory, [38], where a customer will most likely choose a
provider which offers best utility.
B. Provider j’s Revenue Earnings
Provider j receives subsidy in addition to its regular sub-
scription fees. In the SBSS market, a subsidy is determined
by the total market value, Tmv. We denote the provider j’s
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market value, V j, as the number of customers, n j, times
subscription fees, f j. Aggregating all providers’ market values,
we get the Tmv. In our model, we consider a percentage of the
Tmv will be given to provider j as subsidy. Further, it can
generate revenue by freeriding on other providers’ networks.
If a regular non-subsidized market consists of n customers
among which n j are subscribed to provider j, we can suppose
that provider j earns n j f j subscription revenue. However, after
joining in the SBSS market, provider j gets the subsidy ε j,
some of which it can spend to improve its infrastructure, e.g.,
by increasing the number of base stations, X j. It also has
licensed bandwidth, b j, divided equally among all of its BSes,
in order to run cellular operations. Available bandwidth and
the number of BSes determine the signal strength of provider
j, which can be expressed as ψ j = Q(X j, b j) where Q(·) is an
increasing concave function w.r.t. X j and b j, since marginal
signal improvement diminishes with the increase of X j and
b j.
In a multi-provider environment, the government can split
subsidy ε1 further in a way where the provider j earns εkj , a
portion of ε j by serving the customers’ of provider k only.
However, such a split is beyond the scope of this work. We
assume, the government will maintain a suitable policy to





j . Assume that provider j serves F
k
j foreign
calls generated by the customers of provider k, which is the
proof of sharing of provider j’s BSes with other provider’s
customers. A provider is penalized on it’s subsidy based on the
number of foreign calls it serves. We call this a performance-
based subsidy scheme. The higher Fkj , the lower the penalty.
We model the penalty function p(·) which determines the
percentage of the subsidy given to provider j for serving
customers’ of provider k needs to return to the government
as: Pkj = p(F
k
j ) where p(·) is a linear function w.r.t. F
k
j . If
provider j serves all foreign calls, Pkj becomes 0. Contrary,
Pkj = 1, when provider j does not serve any foreign customer.
Based on the provider selection problem (3), a customer
i of provider j is more likely to choose another provider k
if U(i, k) > U(i, j). Also, any change of subscription fees
can change provider selection criteria along with the signal
strength, which is the main driving factor behind U(·). In an
SBSS market, the service utility received from providers j
and k can be the same (or similar in a more general sense)
due to the subsidy for sharing, i.e., U(i, j) = U(i, k). In such
a case, if f j < fk, customer i of provider k will more likely
subscribe to provider j. Assume, by advertising lower-than-fair
subscription fees, i.e., f j < fk, provider j can unfairly attract
nkτk j subscribed customers of k, where τk j = 1−e−C fk/ f j is the
probability of UCS from provider k to provider j. Here, C is
customers’ averseness to price. A high value of C indicates
a high fees difference and a high customers’ averseness to
price. The value of C can be any number where C ≥ 0. When
fk/ f j ≈ ∞, we get τk j ≈ 1 and if fk/ f j ≈ 0, we have τk j ≈ 0.
Now, provider j’s revenue, R j, becomes
max
f j,b j,X j












εkj = ε j (5)
0 ≤ βi, j ≤ γ (6)
βi, ju(ψ j) > f j (7)
0 < f j ≤ fmax (8)
and b j, X j > 0,∀ j. (9)
The first term of (4) denotes the earnings of provider j
from its subscribed customers. The second term describes
the leftover subsidy money. If provider j does not serve a
satisfactory number of foreign calls, it has to return some or all
of ε j. The third term delineates the earnings from net switching
customers.
In an SBSS market, provider j may lose significant number
of customers due to freeriding which eventually generates less
revenue for j compared to a non-shared market. To make sure
j’s participation in the SBSS market, j’s overall earnings must
be at least as much as the revenue of the non-shared market.








(nkτk j − n jτ jk) f j ≥ 0 (10)
V. Game Formation
We mitigate freeriding issue in an SBSS market by devel-
oping a non-cooperative game to hold the condition of (10) by
generate at least the earnings of a non-shared market. Initially,
we consider a two-provider SBSS market, form a 2x2 non-
cooperative game and determine the Nash equilibrium (NE)
of the game. Later, we extend the game to a multi-provider
market by applying the two-provider game among all providers
considering head-to-head competitions.
A. Two-Provider SBSS Market
Consider two providers, Provider I and Provider II, are
competing in an SBSS cellular market with willingness to
shares, ω1 and ω2, respectively. The maximum number of










incoming foreign calls, respectively, where 0 ≤ F21 ≤
∑n2
i=1 αi,2,











A customer’s perceived signal strength of home provider
depends on the distance between his location and the nearest
home BS. So, perceived home signal strength can vary from
customer to customer. Similarly, perceived signal strength for
the foreign calls the customer makes can vary. Thus, the
choice of BS selection to make a call varies from customer
to customer which eventually generates different numbers of
home and foreign calls for different customers. Suppose θ1
denotes the probability that a customer of Provider I chooses
Provider I’s BS to make call (i.e. home call),and θ2 denotes the
probability that a customer of Provider II chooses Provider II’s
BS for a home call. Then θ1 and θ2 are given by the expressions
θ1=Probability[ψ1 ≥ ψ2] + (1 − Probability[ψ1 ≥ ψ2])(1 − ω2)
θ2=Probability[ψ2 ≥ ψ1] + (1 − Probability[ψ2 ≥ ψ1])(1 − ω1)
(11)
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where ψ1 and ψ2 are the signal strengths of Provider I and II,
respectively. Now, the overall perceived signal strengths for
customers of I and II will be
ψ∗1 = θ1ψ1 + (1 − θ1)ψ2 and ψ
∗
2 = θ2ψ2 + (1 − θ2)ψ1. (12)
Consider Provider I has more BSes than II, i.e., X1 > X2.
According to the discussions of Section IV-A, βi,1, βi,2 are
increasing concave functions of the BS counts of the providers.
Likewise, according to Section IV-B, ψ1, ψ2 are increasing
concave functions of the BS counts and bandwidths of the
providers. As X1 > X2, comparing the first terms of (2), βi,1 ∗
u(ψ1) > βi,2 ∗ u(ψ2) holds. So, if f1 ≤ f2, we can infer that
U(i, 1) > U(i, 2). If f1 > f2, we can write that U(i, 1) > U(i, 2)
holds as long as the subscription fees are at their fair market
values. We model an SBSS market which transforms from
the existing market where both providers were charging fair
market fees1 f ∗1 and f
∗
2 . Thus, considering different cases of
both providers’ fees, we can say, Provider I offers better utility
than II before the effects of subsidy take place.
The SBSS cellular market makes a tunnel for the weak
(i.e., small) provider to make extra earnings by freeriding on
the strong (i.e., large) provider. Under the subsidized market,
each provider’s offered cellular utility, U(·), could become
almost equal, and there may remain only a small perceived
difference between cellular providers’ service quality. Assum-
ing no changes of previously subscribed customers’ fees and
considering the possibility of UCS, the revenues under the
subsidized market becomes
R1 = n1 f1 + (1 − P21)ε1 + f1(n2τ21 − n1τ12) (13)
and R2 = n2 f2 + (1 − P12)ε2 + f2(n1τ12 − n2τ21). (14)
In a two-provider SBSS market, we can say ε21 = ε1, ε
1
2 = ε2,
P12 = P2, P
2
1 = P1, and will use these notations in the
following sections. If f1 ≤ f2, most of the potential customers
will go for Provider I’s service in those areas where I has better
coverage. Because, Provider II may offer the same service
utility, i.e., U(i, 1) = U(i, 2), it charges higher subscription
fees. Thus, no UCS and freeriding take place, which is aligned
with the existing market equilibrium. If Provider II aims to
initiate UCS by lowering fees, i.e., f1 > f2, then the market
equilibrium changes. Now, Provider II may offer the same
utility with lower fees, which will attract the customers of
Provider I. Soon, Provider I will lose customers, even though
it has a stronger signal and better coverage. If no subsidy
agreement exists, Provider I could retain these customers.
Depending on the government’s offerings, the subsidy can be
less than the revenue lost due to Provider II’s freeriding, which
demotivates Provider I to continue participating in the SBSS
market.
B. Game for a Two-Provider SBSS Market
To model the free-rider problem, we envision a simple 2x2
noncooperative strategic form game as follows. The two play-
ers are a large provider a.k.a Provider I and a small provider

























Fig. 4: 2x2 game model to control freeriding
a.k.a Provider II. They are competing in an area where
Provider I is able to offer much better service than Provider
II. Now consider customers not subscribed to Provider I, who
venture into this area and wish to make calls. Provider I then
has a decision to make: it can either cover such calls or else
not cover them. Covering them has the benefit of earning
government subsidy benefits, but runs the risk of the free-
riding problem described below. At the same time, Provider
II decides whether to “undercut” Provider I, by offering low-
fee service to these customers. If the Provider I is “covering”
these customers calls, Provider II can freeride – it enrolls the
customers by offering the low-fee services, collects the fees,
but does not have to provide any service because Provider I
is doing so.
The situation outlined above is modelled by the simple 2x2
noncooperative strategic form game as shown in Fig. 4.
The two strategies for Provider I are listed on the left, while
those for Provider II are across the top. The four possible
outcomes are represented by four cells. Of interest here is the
free-rider outcome in the top left (if Provider I “cover calls”
and Provider II charges “low fees”). Also note that there is
another outcome which the government would like, namely for
Provider I to cover foreign calls, but for Provider II to charge
fair market fee and so no freeriding occurs. This is the top
right cell of the bimatrix. The two entries in each cell represent
the payoffs for Provider I and Provider II, respectively, if the
providers play the corresponding strategies. For example, if
Provider I does not cover calls while Provider II charges low
fees, the payoff is e for Provider I and f for Provider II.
In our context, we may assume certain relationships among
the quantities a, b, c, d, e, f , g, and h. First, we may expect
Provider I to earn more with a non-covering strategy instead
of a call-covering strategy against Provider II’s undercutting
low-fees strategy, so a < e. Next, if Provider I does not cover
calls, its revenue will not be affected regardless of Provider
II’s strategies. Thus e = g. Also, if Provider II charges fair
market fees, then Provider I earns more by covering than by
non-covering – hence g < c. Next, if the large provider does
NOT cover calls, Provider II will earn a lower revenue if it
undercuts; so f < h. If Provider II charges fair market fees,
then its earnings will not change, regardless of what Provider I
does, as it is not losing any customers and gaining any subsidy
because ω2 = 0 – thus we get h = d. Finally, if the large
provider is covering calls, it pays off for the small Provider
II to free-ride; hence d < b. Putting all of this together, we
claim that a < e = g < c and f < h = d < b.
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We analyze our game using non-cooperative game theory.
A mixed strategy for Provider I is a two-component vector (p,
1− p) in which p (between 0 and 1) represents the probability
that it will cover calls and 1 − p is the probability it does
not. Similarly, a mixed strategy for Provider II is given by (q,
1 − q), in which q is the probability that it charges low fees.
Given mixed strategies for each provider, it is easy to calculate
the expected payoff for each provider: pqa + p(1 − q)c + (1 −
p)qe + (1 − p)(1 − q)g for Provider I, and pqb + p(1 − q)d +
(1 − p)q f + (1 − p)(1 − q)h for Provider II.
A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a pair of mixed strategies, one
for each provider, in which both providers are maximizing
their expected payoffs given what the other is doing. A stability
concept, it is the most widely used solution concept in game
theory [39]. In our game, under the assumptions a < e = g < c
and f < h = d < b, the unique NE is when Provider I plays
(p∗, 1 − p∗) and Provider II plays (q∗, 1 − q∗), where p∗ =
(h − f )/(b − f ) and q∗ = (c − g)/(c − a).
Now observe what happens if the government raises the
subsidy to the Provider I for covering calls. This raises both
a and c by the same amount, say x. For small x, the effect
is to raise q∗, i.e., to make the Provider II more likely to
undersell. If x = e − a, there is a continuum of NEs, all with
q∗ = 1, i.e., all with Provider II underselling. Similarly, if we
find revenues a ≥ e and d = b, we get a continuum of NEs
where Provider I covers calls with p∗ = 1. Provider II can
play any strategy. Finally, if x > e−a, the unique NE outcome
is the freeriding outcome of p∗ = q∗ = 1. Hence, we see
how the government raising the subsidy triggers the freeriding
problem. This additional subsidy forces the relations between
the revenue earnings where a ≥ e. In this state, covering calls
is a dominating strategy the Provider I, i.e., it is in the best
interest of the Provider I to cover calls, no matter what the
Provider II does. Since d < b, the Provider II’s best response
to this is to charge low fees. Hence, the unique NE is the
freeriding outcome.
So, how can the government encourage its desired outcome?
It merely needs to raise the payoffs (to Provider II) for not
underselling. In terms of our bimatrix, this would raise the
quantities d and h. If done in conjunction with the subsidy
idea above, it could force the NE to be the desired outcome,
i.e., p∗ = 1 and q∗ = 0. In practice, this can be done by either
imposing a price floor for the service subscription fee (so that
charging too small a fee is a crime), or perhaps by allowing
providers to keep more of their fees via lowering particular
penalties on the subsidy benefits from the government.
C. Observations
If we closely observe the game NEs, we see that Provider I’s
strategies ensure it to earn at least the earnings of a non-shared
spectrum market which can be found at the bottom-right cell
of the game matrix. In case of pure strategy NE (PSNE), it
is obvious from the payoffs, e.g., the game NE at the top-left
cell ensures Provider I to get as much as the earnings of a
non-shared market. Similarly, Provider I gets guarantees from
the freeriding-free outcome. In case of mixed strategy NEs,
we can not directly observe such guarantees just looking into
the game matrix. However, if we compute the total revenue
by applying NE strategies, the game guarantees Provider I
no revenue loss. Let analyze this scenario with an example
where the game follows mixed strategies. If a = 8, b = 6, c =
15, d = 5, e = 10, f = 3, g = 10, and h = 5, the game has
an NE with the mixed strategies (0.67, 0.33) and (0.71, 0.29)
for Provider I and II respectively. Provider I’s expected payoff
becomes 10.02, which is higher than the non-shared payoff 10.
Similarly, we will get a higher payoff for all mixed strategy
NEs. In this way, our proposed two-provider game holds the
condition of (10).
D. Game in a Multi-Provider SBSS Market
In a multi-provider SBSS market, we consider each of the
competitor providers individually based on the head-to-head
competitions in generating revenue. In this market, a provider’s
single willingness to share strategy against all providers may
mitigate a freeriding provider’s bad intentions, however, it can
harm the cooperation, good intentions of other providers who
tends to charge fair market fees. A spectrum sharing provider
could increase its willingness to share to serve the customers
of the providers who charge fair market fees. However, to
minimize a freeriding provider’s effects, the spectrum shar-
ing provider is forced to reduce sharing. Eventually, such a
strategy generates fewer subsidy revenue for it.
Regardless of the number of providers are present in
an SBSS market, we always consider head-to-head business
competitions among all providers in a multi-provider mar-
ket and design the game model where a spectrum sharing
provider plays a two-provider game separately with all of its
competitors and finds an appropriate sharing strategy against
each of the competitors. Thus, in a J-provider market, a
spectrum sharing provider may end up with J−1 willingness to
share strategies and ensures none of the competitor’s good/bad
intentions get overlooked.
A provider j can apply strategic decision of sharing with
the presence of a freeriding provider k by following the two-
provider game settings described in earlier section, which
holds the condition of (10), where (1 − Pkj)ε
k
j − n jτ jk f j ≥ 0.
It ensures no revenue loss for provider j. Similarly, in a J-
provider market, provider j can play the two-player game
against each of the J − 1 providers and apply appropriate
sharing strategies to overcome overall revenue loss where∑




k∈J\{ j} n jτ jk f j ≥ 0. Now, the revenue
of provider j becomes:








n jτ jk f j (15)
which is at least the earnings of a non-shared market. Thus,
provider j can apply different strategic decisions of sharing
against each of the competitor providers’ freeriding strategies
and continue participation in the SBSS market without losing
revenue.
VI. Experimental Evaluation
In previous section, we observed a two-provider game
NEs based on different scenarios. In this section, we will
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TABLE I: Parameters & Values
Parameter Value Parameter Value










γ 100 V1, V2 n1 f ∗1 , n2 f
∗
2
π 0.05, 0.5, 0.8,
0.95
Tmv V1 + V2
(X1, X2) (70, 30), (100,
1–100)
ε1, ε2 (4.49, (0–
45))% o f Tmv, 0
perform quantitative analysis of these NEs using simulation.
To analyze the providers’ problem in an SBSS market, we
consider two providers are competing within a single region
where Providers I and II are the large and small providers,
respectively. We use the parameters and initial settings outlined
in Table I. If we look at the functions to determine the
number of customers and fair market fees in Table I and
Section VI-A1, we can see that similar sized providers will
have a similar customer counts and subscription fees. If both
providers are exactly the same, then both will have an equal
customer count and charge equal fees.
On average, we find that a US customer is involved in
6 phone calls per day and 180 calls per month [40]. Thus
the maximum limit of home calls can be 180 in a non-
shared spectrum market. We consider approximately 55% of
this number in our model, which is 100 as the total calls a
customer will make monthly in the SBSS market. Limiting the
maximum calls from real-world statistics helps us to overcome
the diminishing effect of excessive home calls on subscription
fees. We limit the maximum fee a provider can charge to 80
units based on the US’s primary providers’ maximum fees for
similar service [41].
In our model, one provider shares spectrum resources and
the other does not. Because of UCS, some customers may
move from one provider to other. If both providers are similar
in size and both are sharing, then the probability of UCS
will be small and similar in both directions. If one of them
takes new strategies on fees or willingness to share spectrum
resources, the other provider will be forced to follow similar
strategies to keep its subscribers. As fee difference is a key
factor for freeriding, similar fees will overcome the freeriding
issues. Our objective in this work is to identify potential
freeriding possibilities and take countermeasures against them.
Hence, we mostly focus on the harmful conditions where
fees differences are significantly high. We can obtain such
market conditions when the difference between the size of two
providers is high. For this reason, we focus on a large and a
small provider market to evaluate our model. We start with
customer utility, demand and call quality. Later, we analyze
customers’ price averseness and UCS. Finally, we illustrate
the strategies associated with each game NE.
A. Experimental Setup
We enlist the simulation parameters in Table I where n and
γ denote the number of customers within the experimental
region and the total number of calls each customer makes,
respectively. The large Provider I has better area coverage than
II and is more willing to share its spectrum resources. These
willingness to shares, ω1 and ω2, represent the initial agree-
ment between providers indicating the percentage of incoming
foreign calls they will serve. Initially, we set Providers I and
II’s BS count to 70 and 30 respectively, a high value 0.8 for
ω1 to observe freeriding scenarios, and 0 for ω2 as Provider
II does not share spectrum resources. Except Section VI-B3,
we use this count of BSes throughout the experiments. We
randomly set up each provider’s BSes in a 35×35 square grid
and calculate the number of customers, n1, n2, subscribed to
the providers based on the BS counts as shown in Table I. Also,
we position all customers in the experimental region randomly.
We apply a linear penalty, P1 = 1 − F21/Ft, to Provider I on
given subsidy where Ft is the total incoming foreign calls to
Provider I.
1) Customer Utility and Demand: We model a customer’s
perceived signal utility from Providers I and II as u1 = u(ψ1)
and u2 = u(ψ2) where u(ψ1) = log(Q1) and u(ψ2) = log(Q2),
respectively, and formulate the signal quality offered by a
provider as an increasing concave function of BS count, and
decreasing convex function of the number of customers. In
particular, we use Q1 = Xπ1/n1 and Q2 = X
π
2/n2 to represent
the offered signal quality to the customers of Providers I and
II where π is a constant expressing the benefit of having more
BSes to the signal strength. It describes, within a fixed size
region, how the marginal improvement on the offered signal
quality will diminish w.r.t. the BS count. To assure concavity,
π must be in (0, 1), and we chose π = 0.8 for rest of the
experiments except Section VI-B5. With same π, the small
provider’s offered signal quality and utility will improve more
than the large providers’ if we increase their base station
counts by the same amount.
π also helps to determine fair market fees for both providers.
Using the marginal utilities, u′1 and u
′
2, we define the fair
market fees as: f ∗1 = u
′











2 which is expected in
a normal market where market leader charges higher than the
followers [42]. We determine both providers’ market values,
V1, V2, and the total market value, Tmv, using fair market fees
as shown in Table I. Based on Tmv, we start with subsidies,
ε1 = 4.49% of Tmv, and ε2 = 0, as Provider II does not share
spectrum resources. Later, we vary ε1 between 0–45% of Tmv
and observe market equilibrium. 45% of Tmv is already too
much subsidy considering real markets. As a result, we do
not consider higher subsidy amounts.
2) Overall Perceived Quality: To measure the signal
strength of each provider, we consider the received power
at free space. For simplicity, we only consider the distance
from a caller to the BS for the main beam and ignore any
multi-path beams. We define ψ1 = 1/d21 and ψ2 = 1/d
2
2
where d1 and d2 represent the distance from a customer to
the nearest BS of Provider I and Provider II, respectively. As
we consider a simplified game model where only Provider
I is willing to share (i.e., ω1 > 0, ω2 = 0), all calls of
Provider I’s customers are considered as home calls. However,
for Provider II, it depends on the signal strength of both
providers. If the nearest BS is one of Provider I’s, then the
decision to serve as a foreign call is made based on a random
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Algorithm 1 NE Strategies
Input: ω1, n1, n2, f1, f2, γ
Output: Both providers NE strategies
1: procedure NEStrategy(ω1, n1, n2, f1, f2, γ)
2: for i = 1 to n2 do
3: for j = 1 to γ do
4: Randomly determine customer i’s position
5: if (Provider I’s base station is the nearest) then
6: if (A randomly generated number ranged [0:1] ≤ ω1) then
7: Call is served by Provider I
8: else
9: Call is served by Provider II
10: end if
11: else




16: Compute P1 and τ12
17: Compute all payoffs of the two-provider game
18: Compute and return NE strategies: {(p∗, 1 − p∗), (q∗, 1 − q∗)}
19: end procedure
number ranged between 0 to 1. If the number is at most ω1,
then Provider I serves it as a foreign call. Thus, the number
of home and foreign calls may vary for all customers of
Provider II. Considering the randomness of the locations of
BSes, customers, and determination of foreign vs. home calls,
we have run our experiments 7 times and took the average of
them to calculate the signal qualities ψ1 and ψ2, and overall
perceived qualities ψ∗1 and ψ
∗
2.
3) Price Averseness and UCS: The probability of UCS is





f2, then the probability of the UCS initiated by Provider II
becomes: τ12 = 1 − e−C f
∗
1 / f2 . The probability of the UCS is
high when the price averseness, C, is high. In a normal market,
we believe customers are very averse with price. Hence, we
use a moderate high value for C which is 0.9, except Section
VI-B6. Due to UCS, Provider I’s lost customers n1τ12, can
range between 0 to n1 depending on τ12.
4) Algorithm to Find Nash Equilibrium: To determine an
NE of the game, we summarize the elaborate discussion of
Section VI-A, VI-A1, VI-A2 and VI-A3 and transform to a
simplified algorithm Algo. 1.
B. Results
In this section, we illustrate observed NEs and both
providers’ strategies. We find the effects of different subsidies
on game NEs, e.g., a large subsidy, study how the NE
changes with the change of small provider’s BS count, and the
contribution of marginal signal improvement. We also analyze
how an NE can shift from one state to another due to the small
provider’s UCS strategy as well as for the large provider’s
willingness to share.
1) Strategies of Large and Small Providers at Equilibrium:
We have observed the NE strategies taken by Provider I,
p∗, and Provider II, q∗, against Provider II’s low fee, f2, to
fair market fee, f ∗2 , ratio, r. We have taken 30, 50 and 70
different data points between the ranges 0 ≤ r ≤ 0.199,
0.2 ≤ r ≤ 0.4 and 0.41 ≤ r ≤ 1 respectively to evaluate.
We consider Provider I’s three reference willingness to shares
(ω1 = 0.3, 0.8 and 0.96) and draw the graphs, Fig. 5. If we
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Fig. 5: NE strategies w.r.t. r
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Fig. 6: NE strategies w.r.t. ω1
continue increasing Provider II’s fees towards the fair market
fee, i.e., r → 1, Provider I plays a less sharing strategy
(lowering p∗), and Provider II undersells more (higher q∗)
at high ω1. It happens because of increasing fees nearer to
the fair market fee causes less revenue loss for Provider II
compared to the earnings from UCS, and high revenue loss
for Provider I due to freeriding. We observe a transition of p∗
from pure strategy, p∗ = 1, to a mixed strategy between fees
ratio, r = 0.41 to r = 0.42. This, r = 0.41, is the terminal
fees ratio up-to which Provider I can always maintain agreed
sharing without facing any loss. At low willingness to share,
ω1 = 0.3, we observe no freeriding and it takes place at
high willingness to share, ω1 = 0.8 or 0.96. Once Provider
I starts losing revenue due to UCS, it chooses mixed strategy
to overcome the loss.
We have observed the NE strategies p∗ and q∗ for Provider
I’s all possible willingness to shares, ω1. We have considered
50, 90 and 10 different data points between the ranges 0 ≤
ω1 ≤ 0.599, 0.6 ≤ ω1 ≤ 0.9 and 0.91 ≤ ω1 ≤ 1 respectively,
and plotted the graphs for three different r where the values
are 0.3, 0.8 and 0.96, Fig. 6. At same ω1, Provider I is more
interested for less sharing with the increase of Provider II’s
fees towards the fair market fee. We observe both providers
play freeriding-free pure strategies, p∗ = 1, q∗ = 0, at low fees
ratio, r = 0.3. In case of high fees ratio, r = 0.8 or 0.96, both
starts playing mixed strategies above a certain ω1. We have
seen a transition phase of p∗ (from 1 to a proper fraction)
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Fig. 8: NE for different r w.r.t. ε1
when ω1 is 0.69. It is Provider I’s terminal willingness to
share up-to which I can always maintain agreed willingness to
share irrespective of Provider II’s strategies. As we calculate
p∗ with the fraction of (h − f ) to (b − f ), it is expected to
reduce p∗ to that level where the fraction is located in Fig. 6.
We also observe that both providers maintain same strategy for
certain period of ω1. It happens, because, between this period,
Provider II cannot earn more from UCS.
2) Effect of Subsidy: We run the experiment with Provider
I’s 100 different subsidies from 0% to 45% o f Tmv, and ob-
served the equilibrium behaviors. We have seen that Provider
I is less interested in sharing with the increase of Provider
II’s fees closer to fair market fees. However, if we continue
increasing ε1, Provider I is finally able to overcome its loss due
to UCS. Additional subsidy can encourage it to play the most
sharing strategy, p∗ = 1, which may initiate freeriding. Fig.
7 describes the case where we plot graphs against Provider
I’s three different willingness to shares (ω1 = 0.3, 0.8, 0.96).
For same r, a high value of ω1 encourages Provider II
to undersell mostly, and this forces Provider I to play a
less sharing strategy. In case of ω1 = 0.8, if we continue
increasing ε1, Provider I is able to overcome revenue loss when
ε1 = 0.202Tmv, which encourages Provider I to share more
(p∗ = 1). However, Provider II continues its mixed strategy
onwards as it cannot make more profits from UCS. When
ω1 = 0.96, we find the start of freeriding, p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1, at
ε1 = 0.175Tmv.
Fig. 8 tells the same story from a different perspective
where NEs are observed against Provider II’s three different
fees ratios, r = 0.3, 0.8 and 0.96. When r = 0.8 and
r = 0.96, Provider I and Provider II play mixed strategies up
to ε1 = 0.238Tmv and ε1 = 0.139Tmv respectively. After these
ε1’s, freeriding takes place. We also observe, when r = 0.3,
Provider I and Provider II play p∗ = 1 and q∗ = 0 respectively
which remain unchanged. It happens because of Provider II’s
low charging fee. At r = 0.3, Provider II is charging 30% of
its fair market fee. With this fee, it can attract a significant
number of customers from Provider I, however, the aggregate
revenue in this situation becomes lower than the revenue when
it charges a fair market fee. Thus, Provider II’s choice of not
freeriding helps Provider I to play a maximum sharing strategy.
3) Effect of Base Stations: We evaluate game NEs with
Provider I’s fixed BS count to 100 and Provider II’s varying
BS count between 1-100% of Provider I’s BS count. For all
cases of Fig. 9, no freeriding takes place when the size of
Provider II is too small. It happens because of Provider II’s
customers overall perceived signal strength. When Provider
II’s BS count is small, its customers will mostly find Provider
I’s BSes as the nearest BS, and Provider I will serve these
customers based on its strategic decision of sharing. As a
result, Provider II’s customers overall perceived signal strength
cannot exceed that Provider I’s customers enjoy. If Provider
II’s BS count is around half of Provider I’s BS count,
the perceived signal strengths by both providers customers
changes and UCS occurs. It forces Provider I to reduce sharing
and start playing mixed strategy. If Provider II’s BS count is
similar to the Provider I’s BS count, no freeriding takes place.
Though Provider II’s customers receive better signal strength
compared to Provider I’s customers, the difference between
both providers’ charging fees remains low for which Provider
II cannot initiate enough UCS to earn more by charging lower-
than-fair fees. This low fees difference and low earning force
Provider II to charge fair market fees. The freeriding and non-
freeriding regions depend on parameters ε1, r, and ω1. From
Fig. 9a(ii) and 9b(ii), when ω1 = 0.8, ε1 = 4.49% of Tmv and
r = 0.96, we observe a freeriding case (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) if
Provider II’s BS count is between 85-98% of Provider I’s BS
count. This happens because of the high value of r (i.e., f2
is closer to f ∗2 ), Provider I loses few customers to Provider II
and earns enough subsidy to overcome the loss. When both
providers are almost equal in size (i.e., X2 = 99 or 100% of
X1), no freeriding takes place. From Fig. 9a(iii), we observe
freeriding takes place if Provider II’s BS count is between 74-
78% and 43-78% of Provider I’s BS count when ε1 = 15% of
Tmv and ε1 = 35% of Tmv respectively.
In the SBSS market, a user receives better signal strength
which enables better wireless experience. From Fig. 9b(i),
a customer of Provider II enjoys higher signal strength if
Provider I increases ω1 when all other conditions remained
unchanged. If both would share, then the perceived signal
strength for both customers’ would have improved. This delin-
eates how spectrum sharing in the SBSS market can improve
a user’s perceived quality of service.
4) Effect of Sharing on Call Types: In an SBSS market,
customers of Provider II can make calls similar to roaming.
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(a) Both providers’ strategies for different ω1, r and ε1
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(b) Both providers’ signal strength for different ω1, r and ε1
Fig. 9: NE strategies and perceived signal strengths for different X2 counts
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(c) Provider II’s fees ratio
Fig. 10: Calls generated by the customers of Provider II
However, in roaming, the number of calls served by foreign
providers are not high because of cellular providers geo-
operational strategies. In the SBSS market, it can be signifi-
cantly high because of pervasive sharing. If we vary Provider
II’s size from 1 to 100% of Provider I’s size, customers of
Provider II make fewer foreign calls using I’s network with
the increase of size, Fig. 10a. At the same time, the percentage
of rejections by Provider I are also reduced and overall
home calls made through II’s network has been increased.
For fixed-sized providers set, the percentage of foreign calls
increases with the increase of ω1, Fig. 10b. If we only change
Provider II’s fees, the percentage of home calls, foreign calls
or declined foreign calls remain unchanged. Because, these
numbers depend ω1 and X2. From Fig. 10c, we observe
both X2, and ω1 remain unchanged. Now, if we only vary
Provider II’s fees, f2, to observe the effect on the number
of calls, it will not differ significantly. Lowering fees may
attract customers from Provider I in the long run and change
the stats, however, for a given condition the number of calls
will remain unchanged as we are not considering customer
switching effects for this particular experiment. Instead, we
are interested to find the numbers of different types of calls
on average Provider II’s subscribed customers are making at
an instance if Provider II charges any low-fee other than its fair
market fee. If the market consists of more than two providers,
declined customers may get served by other better providers
instead of complete rejection or re-routed to home network.
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Fig. 11: NE for a set of π w.r.t. ω1
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Fig. 12: NE for a set of π w.r.t. r
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(c) w.r.t. price averseness
Fig. 13: Equilibrium strategies and always on full sharing with a set of C
5) Effect of Marginal Signal Improvement: Equilibrium
strategies w.r.t. different π values are shown in Fig. 11 and
12. If we increase π by same amount for both providers,
Provider I’s higher sharing region increases. This happens due
to two reasons, (1) the higher the π is, the closer each other’s
fees are, and (2) if the customers get equal improvement on
signal strength from both providers, Provider I still remains
ahead of Provider II. As a result, UCS probability remains low,
which encourages Provider I for higher sharing. If π is high,
and Provider II’s charging fee stays near to fair market fee,
Provider I can switch to play higher sharing pure strategy from
a low sharing mixed strategy, Fig. 12. It happens, because,
higher sharing brings more revenue from the subsidy than the
subscription revenue lost due to UCS. In this case, a small
amount of subsidy is enough to drive a provider for higher
sharing, e.g., if π = 0.95, and r = 0.93, ε1 = 0.0449Tmv is
enough to motivate Provider I to switch from a mixed strategy
to the higher sharing pure strategy.
6) Effect of Price Averseness and UCS: Customers are very
averse with the price they pay for a service. In an SBSS
market, a provider’s willingness to share and low fees can
cause UCS because of price averseness. If we increase C, the
probability of UCS increases and the resource sharing provider
looses customers. A resource sharing provider can maintain
high sharing irrespective of customers’ price averseness if a
competitor provider always charges same fee. From Fig. 13a,
if Provider II always charges 80% of it’s fair market fee,
Provider I can maintain pure strategy (p∗ = 1) up-to ω1 = 0.69
irrespective of C. However, if Provider II charges different
fees, we can see in Fig. 13b that the price averseness affects
Provider I’s sharing and it chooses mixed strategy soon with
the increase of C.
We observe the scenarios of how long Provider I can play
pure strategy (p∗ = 1) or always maintain agreed sharing
(i.e., ω1 = 0.8 in Fig. 13c) if we gradually increase C and
take different π. It tells us the fees ratio ( f2/ f ∗1 ) up-to which
Provider I will play higher sharing pure strategy whatever
Provider II does. Above this fees ratio, Provider I starts
playing mixed strategy. We observe that, with the increase
of C and π, Provider I is more willing to share its spectrum
resources. Because, it can tolerate a high price averseness at
high marginal signal improvement. Also, if we increase ε1, the
region of always on full sharing up-to agreed ω1 increases. In
this observation, the assumption of a high ω1, e.g., 0.8, comes
from the experiment (described in Section VI-B7) where we
found that for any ε1, Provider I always play higher sharing
pure strategy up-to ω1 = 0.69.
7) Large Provider’s Willingness to Share and Weak
Provider’s Effort to Trigger UCS: Higher sharing is expected
in the SBSS market. However, higher sharing increases the
chance of revenue loss for the provider who shares spectrum
resources. Lowering fee is beneficial for a freeriding provider.
However, if the fees are too low compared to fair market fee,
lowering fees can be a bad move for it. Thus, there is always a
willingness to share, and a fees ratio, below which any sharing
can be ensured with PSNE.
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Fig. 14: Threshold of ω1 w.r.t r
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Fig. 15: Threshold of r w.r.t ω1
We observe equilibrium strategies against given subsidy to
Provider I and for a given set of Provider II’s fees ratio as
described in Fig. 14. When the f es ratio is 30%, we see both
providers are interested to play freeriding-free pure strategies,
i.e., p∗ = 1 and q∗ = 0, for any ω1, Fig. 14a. With the increase
of fees ratio, we observe both pure and mixed strategy NEs,
Fig. 14b and Fig. 14c. However, for any r and ε1, we observe
a freeriding-free PSNE up-to ω1 = 0.69. We also observe
NE strategies against given subsidy to Provider I and its a
set of willingness to share in Fig. 15. When sharing is low,
e.g., ω1 = 0.4 in Fig. 15a, both providers play the freeriding
free PSNE. With the increase of sharing, we observe both
pure and mixed strategy NEs, Fig. 15b and Fig. 15c. If the
fees ratio r is high, the game exhibits a freeriding equilibrium
with the increase of subsidy. The high ω1, the more we get
the freeriding equilibrium when all game conditions remain
unchanged. However, for all cases, if r ≤ 0.41, we get
freeriding-free PSNEs. Above of this ratio, we observe both
players adjust their pure strategy to mixed strategy to ensure
profits. In this case, r = 0.41 is the threshold fees ratio, bellow
which Provider II is not interested to play freeriding strategy,
q∗ = 1, as it can not make profit from UCS.
8) Comparison with Cellular Roaming: In general cellular
roaming [4] is a “pay per use” service and highly dependent
on the agreement among providers even though users may
not know how much of their payment is for roaming. Being
confidential data, the serving rate of a particular provider’s
roamed customers is not available. Thus, we needed to make
an assumption. We assume 50% of Provider II’s customers
get paid roaming service from Provider I. This number is
significantly high when compared with actual data as very
few customers are interested in roaming because of the high
charging rate. From the simulation setup in earlier sections,
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Fig. 16: Ratio of No. of customers get served
we already know that each customer makes 100 calls in a
monthly subscription. Thus the number of calls a customer
is expected to make in a day, a week, and bi-weekly are
3, 23, and 47 (all numbers are rounded) respectively. We
consider these three cases to identify how many customers
of Provider II actually get such services from Provider I in an
SBSS market. We looked for ω1 when the ratio of Provider
II’s number of beneficiary customers to II’s total number
of customers become 50%. We also observe the maximum
number of customers that get served by Provider I at what
ω1.
From Fig. 16, we find that 50% of Provider II’s customers
get roamed service from Provider I as per roaming agreement
that includes all the three cases. In an SBSS market, if ω1 is
at least 0.03, 0.33 and 0.66, we find that 50% of Provider II’s
customers get 1-day, 1-week and 2-week equivalent services
from Provider I. When ω1 is 0.14, 0.53 and 0.9, Provider II’s
all customers get 1-day, 1-week, and 2-week equivalent ser-
vices from Provider I respectively. By increasing ω1, Provider
I can serve Provider II’s same number of customers with long-
duration services. However, in roaming, this number remains
constant. Thus, by motivating Provider I for higher sharing,
an SBSS market can improve Provider II’s customers’ overall
wireless experience without paying any additional charges, and
vice versa.
9) Strategies in a Multi-provider SBSS Market: We made
our observation on a 3-provider SBSS market where Provider
I, II, and III’s base station counts are 50, 30, and 20 respec-
tively. We compute all providers’ customer counts and their
fair market fees as proportionate to their base station counts
as described in Table I.
We assume, Provider I gets subsidy ε1 = 0.05Tmv from
the government. It will receive three-fifth of ε1 for serving
Provider II’s customers and rest for Provider III’s customers.
In this market, we determine all providers’ strategies by
playing two-provider games where Provider I shares spectrum
resources, and Provider II and III try to get additional benefits
by charging 80% of their fair market fees, as shown in Fig.
17. We observe Provider I plays pure strategies to cover calls
from the customers of Provider II until ω1 = 0.42. If Provider
I makes an initial promise of ω1 > 0.42, it can not always
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Fig. 17: 3-provider SBSS market strategies
maintain that agreement. Instead, it chooses to play a mixed
strategy to maintain its non-SBSS revenue. In the case of
serving Provider III’s customers, Provider I can maintain high
sharing up to ω1 = 0.74. Considering the market competition,
Provider II is the immediate competitor for Provider I based
on its size. Thus, any freeriding strategy from Provider II will
hurt Provider I’s revenue significantly. As a result, Provider
I is more cautious while sharing resources with Provider II’s
customers. Here, we only consider a 3-provider SBSS market.
It can be extended to a multi-provider market where the
number of providers is greater than 3. For such a market,
we will get Provider I’s sharing strategies corresponding to all
providers’ freeriding strategies.
VII. Conclusions and FutureWork
In this paper, we have considered a non-cooperative game-
theoretic framework for an SBSS market, where the amount
of customer switching triggered by a freeriding provider can
be reduced and the earnings of the spectrum sharing provider
remains at least as much as the earnings from the existing non-
shared spectrum market. Our proposed game model can ensure
the spectrum sharing provider to serve up to a certain sharing
percentage of total incoming foreign calls at all times. Above
this willingness to share, our model helps both providers to
maintain a mixed strategy to control freeriding. Also, there
exists a fees ratio (i.e., the potential disparity of the freeriding
provider’s fee to a fair market fee), below which a spec-
trum sharing provider can always share. We have considered
customers’ price averseness to determine customer switching
probability arising from freeriding and shown the impact of
subsidy in an SBSS cellular market. We also observed the
NEs with different sizes of the providers. If the size difference
between two providers is large or they are similar in size,
we observed no freeriding takes place. We also discussed
the application of the two-provider game in a multi-provider
environment.
We leave exploration of NEs from the repeated games as
future work. Exploration of marginal signal improvement is
another worthy future work. Here, we have used same value
for both providers. Different values may substantially increase/
decrease the size of the desired/undesired equilibrium regions.
In a competitive market, along with different marginal signal
improvement values, a small amount of subsidy can motivate
a provider for higher sharing.
Our game-theoretic framework is a good way to identify
good willingness to share values for a provider. But, a provider
in SBSS will have to use its willingness to share to tune its
strategy. If the provider wants to increase its subsidy revenue,
it should increase its willingness to share. Yet, the provider
will run the risk of exposing itself to potential freeriding
providers. It is an open issue to develop strategies for a
provider in the SBSS market. From a provider’s perspective,
the willingness to share parameter adds a new knob in addition
to its subscription fee. By tuning both the willingness to
share and subscription fee, the providers in SBSS can find the
optimum operational regime for themselves. This is a dynamic
optimization problem for SBSS, which we have not focused
on in this paper. Also, we have not considered Mobile Virtual
Operators (MVNOs) as part of the game-theoretic model. As
such virtual operators without any infrastructure are being
considered, looking at the effect of such operators on the SBSS
markets will be an interesting direction to take.
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